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Introduction 
 
Until quite recently, research on the economic integration of immigrants into destination 
societies focused on one destination society at a time while comparing immigrants from 
many origin countries.1 Although this research has been instrumental in exploring the role of 
such factors as discrimination, human capital, ethnic capital, and labor market duality in 
accounting for relative immigrant disadvantage in specific national labor markets, it does not 
permit variation in the institutional structures and immigration policies of host countries 
required to understand how these structures and policies may impact on immigrant success in 
the labor market. The emphasis in this research has instead been on how characteristics of the 
immigrants themselves and, to a lesser extent, characteristics of their origin countries (e.g. 
Wanner 1998) affect economic outcomes, such as rates of employment, earnings, 
occupational attainment, or unemployment. 
Although increasing scholarly attention has been devoted to understanding the influence 
of characteristics of host societies on the reception and integration of immigrants,2 a great 
deal of this research studies policy or institutional influences in the context of a single 
society, restricting the generalizability of findings. However, consistent with Portes’ (1999) 
call for more cross-national comparisons to test immigration theories, a number of scholars 
have examined how institutional features of the host society impact on immigrants’ labor 
market outcomes using cross-national designs. They have done this either by studying a 
single immigrant group in two or more host societies (Cheng, 1994; Model et al., 1999; 
Lewin-Epstein et al., 2003; Kogan, 2003) or by incorporating multiple countries of origin 
groups migrating to multiple destination countries (Reitz, 1998; Reitz et al., 1999). In all 
cases this research has been limited to a small number of host countries, and generally to the 
traditional immigrant receiving societies, so these authors have not been able to Model 
explicitly the cross-national differences in effects they observe. Instead, their explanation of 
these observed differences involves differences in policies and institutions of the host 
countries, but is usually ad hoc and not clearly tied to theory. A number of scholars have 
independently and simultaneously seen that a stricter test of hypotheses regarding the effects 
of host country policies or institutions and/or origin country characteristics requires a design 
that incorporates data for both multiple origin countries and multiple host countries 
sufficiently large in number to support a multilevel analysis (van Tubergen, Maas & Flap, 
2004; van Tubergen, 2005; Kogan, 2004) in which characteristics of individual migrants 
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constitute the first level and characteristics of the host country and/or the country of origin 
the second level. The present paper takes this approach.  
Our goals in this paper are, first, to determine the extent to which immigrants coming 
from less developed or more developed countries have lower incomes compared to the native 
born, and whether this remains true when human capital factors are controlled. Should we 
find variability in immigrant incomes across countries, we aim to determine how destination 
countries’ immigration and settlement policies contribute to or detract from immigrants’ 
ability to integrate economically. 
 
International Migration in the 20th Century  
 
At this point in history, it is no longer sufficient for comparative research on immigration to 
concentrate on the traditional immigrant receiving countries, specifically Canada, the United 
States, Australia, New Zealand, or, early in the 20th century, Argentina. These were the 
primary receiving nations for migrants leaving Europe up to roughly the end of World War I 
(Massey et al., 1998). After a period between the two world wars during which international 
migration was greatly reduced, there was substantial movement of again mainly European 
migrants to the traditional receiving countries. During the 1960s a period of “post-industrial 
migration” (Massey et al., 1998) began, characterized by both an increase in the number of 
sending and receiving countries and by a shift in the supply of immigrants away from 
traditional European sources to less developed Third World countries (Castles and Miller, 
1998). Canada’s experience is typical. With changes to immigration regulations in the 1960s 
eliminating the system of “preferred nationalities” in favor of a point system that screens 
immigrants on the basis of labor market suitability, the predominant immigrant flow shifted 
from Europe to Asia between the 1970s and the 1990s. Indeed, by 1991 a majority of 
immigrants coming to Canada originated in Asia (McVey and Kalbach, 1995).  
After World War II the diversity of immigrant receiving countries began to increase, but 
initially consisted of flows of foreign workers considered temporary (“guest workers”) to 
countries including Britain, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Germany, 
as well as workers imported from former colonies in the cases of Britain, France, and the 
Netherlands (Castles and Miller, 1998). However, by the 1980s European countries that for a 
century had experienced large-scale emigration, such as Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece, 
also became net receivers of immigrants. After the demise of communist governments in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s eliminated regimes that 
prohibited most emigration by their citizens, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech and Slovak 
Republics emerged as destinations for the large number of refugees created by the economic 
and political chaos in states further to the east and south. As a consequence, several of these 
countries will also be included in our analysis even though their experience as immigrant 
receiving countries is very recent. The “globalization of international migration” (Castles and 
Miller, 1998) has created a substantial number of immigrant receiving countries in the 
Middle East, particularly the oil-producing countries, and Asia, particularly Japan, Korea, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. Since data of the kind required by 
our analysis are not available for countries in these regions, we are not able to include them. 
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Policy Effects: A Mixed Record 
 
Although humanitarian considerations, including family reunification and concern for the 
plight of refugees, often motivate immigration policies, the ultimate motivation is generally 
economic, to fill gaps in the labor force created by an insufficient domestic labor supply. As 
a consequence, policies generally revolve around who gets in and what sorts of skills they 
bring with them. While it would seem to be a simple matter to hypothesize policy effects on 
socioeconomic outcomes among immigrants, the available research suggests that it is not at 
all simple. Based on the results of case studies of nine immigrant receiving countries which 
comprise the chapters of their edited volume, Cornelius et al. (1994; 2004) claim support for 
two general hypotheses.3 Their “convergence hypothesis” states that the more developed 
immigrant receiving countries are growing more similar in their policies to control illegal 
immigration and refugee flows, the outcome of those policies, their policies to integrate 
immigrants once they arrive, and public opinion regarding immigration and government 
immigration policies. What they call the “gap hypothesis” argues that in “all major 
industrialized democracies” a gap has emerged between the goals of immigration policy and 
observed outcomes, and that this gap grows wider over time. This is documented by the 
authors of several chapters in their book as well as in research by others (Duleep and Regets, 
1992; Reitz, 1998). Two examples should suffice. In a number of countries, including the 
U.S. (Calavita, 1994), Germany (Kurthen, 1995), and Denmark (Enoch, 1994), policies 
originally introduced to control the number of immigrants ended up promoting more 
immigration and encouraging permanent settlement of those originally admitted as guest 
workers. Second, a country’s immigration policy may on the face of it be less selective on 
the basis of skills, yet result in more highly skilled immigrants than countries with explicit 
skill selection schemes. This is the case for most country of origin groups in the U.S., where 
policy focuses less on skill selection, compared to Canada and Australia, both of which rely 
on a point system to screen some categories of immigrants.  
Additional complications are created by the way in which government policies beyond 
those designed to regulate immigration may affect immigrant integration (Reitz, 2002). 
These include not only programs directly influencing immigrant settlement, such as language 
training, assistance with housing or employment counseling, but also broader policies 
regarding inter-ethnic relations, education, or the labor market. This may account for the 
preponderance of existing studies of policy effects being case studies, since such a design 
makes it possible for the researcher to attend to the subtle relationships among policies and 
their outcomes in a single national context. While we may lose the ability to incorporate such 
subtleties in an analysis using a “large-N” design, we gain the ability to observe variance in 
the economic integration of various origin groups and to determine broadly if such variance 
is related to policy differences. Given the often indeterminate nature of the fit between 
policies and their outcomes described above, perhaps the most reasonable general hypothesis 
to entertain would be the “gap hypothesis” of Cornelius et al. (1994), under which either 
weak or no policy effects are observed. We discuss this further in the next section in which 
we consider the specific dimensions of immigration policy and their measures. 
 
Defining the Dimensions of Immigration Policy 
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Rather than informally comparing immigrant economic integration in a few nations that 
differ in their immigration policies, we attempt to measure more formally the dimensions of 
policy for the countries included in our multilevel analysis. Despite the complexities of the 
immigration policies of specific countries, key policy decisions that must be faced by any 
country admitting immigrants revolve around the number to be admitted, whether they will 
be admitted on the basis of economic, family reunification, or humanitarian grounds or some 
combination of the three, whether or not they will be screened and on what basis, what 
settlement assistance, if any, will be provided, and under what conditions they may be 
granted citizenship. Although these are the key concerns, other policy matters include how 
illegal immigrants will be dealt with, including policing of unauthorized arrivals, 
adjudicating refugee claims, and controlling the employment of illegal workers, extension of 
voting privileges, and international agreements governing the flow of immigrants and 
temporary foreign workers, including free trade agreements.  
Although they use them to develop a typology of immigrant-receiving nations instead of 
in the sort of analysis presented here, a promising set of policy dimensions that lend 
themselves to empirical measurement were developed by Lynch and Simon (2003). These 
dimensions include admissions rates, the prevalence of illegal migration, the use of systems 
of preferences, the ease with which immigrants become naturalized citizens, the degree of 
internal regulation of immigrants, the amount of discretion afforded immigration authorities, 
and the presence of policies facilitating the integration of immigrants into the host society. 
Admission rates vary widely for the countries considered here, both between countries and 
over time. The traditional immigration countries still have by far the highest ratios of 
immigrant admissions to native-born population, though the admission ratios of some of the 
new immigration countries of Europe have been increasing. In the case of illegal or 
undocumented migration, the United States continues to have the highest rate. This results 
from a combination of a long common border with a less affluent country, a vested interest 
on the part of some employers to hire undocumented labor, and weak internal controls. 
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have the most formalized systems of preferences which 
are based on a points-scheme that benefits potential immigrants who have high levels of 
education, occupational skills that are in demand, and skill in an official language, though 
other countries also have systems of preferences in place. Rates of naturalization also range 
widely, with Canada and Australia regularly having the highest rates. Countries that admitted 
a majority of immigrants as guest workers, such a Germany, tend to have extremely low rates 
of naturalization. Whether or not a country attempts to regulate the activities of immigrants 
appears to depend largely on whether their legal system is based on common law or civil law 
principles (Lynch and Simon, 2003). Thus countries such as Canada, Australia, the United 
States, and Great Britain impose few controls on the movements of immigrants, while 
Germany and France, which issue internal identity cards to all residents, are able to scrutinize 
the movements of their immigrant populations. The traditional immigrant receiving countries 
are also characterized by greater political oversight of the bureaucracy overseeing 
immigration, often with legislative bodies setting immigration quotas and governing terms 
and conditions of entry. Finally, there is great variation in the extent to which host societies 
assist immigrants in their integration, particularly economic integration. At one extreme, 
countries such as Australia, Germany, and Israel provide a great deal of assistance to recent 
immigrants, including such things as job training, housing assistance, language training, and 
social welfare benefits. At the other extreme, countries such as the U.S. and Japan have few 
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programs to assist immigrants. While many countries, including Canada and New Zealand, 
have few direct government programs assisting immigrants, governments provide indirect 
assistance by funding nongovernmental organizations that work with immigrants. 
The vast majority of theorizing on policy effects has been restricted to policies governing 
admission quotas and selective preference systems. Little attention has been paid to the other 
dimensions of policy. In the case of selectivity, comparisons of immigrants to Canada and 
Australia, countries that utilize a “point system” to screen for employment-related 
characteristics, such as education, experience, language ability, and a job offer, to immigrants 
to the U.S. or Israel, which have less selective policies, (Borjas 1988; Lewin-Epstein et al, 
2003; Reitz 1998) find that immigrants to Canada and Australia tend to have higher earnings. 
However, in Canada and Australia, as well as New Zealand, another country using a point 
system, only a minority of immigrants is assessed by the point system, since it is not used to 
screen refugees and family members. It is certainly true that within Canada immigrants in the 
economic class that are screened by the point system have higher initial earnings than 
refugees and family members, though the earnings of the latter two groups also converge 
with the earnings of the native born well within the span of a career (Wanner, 2003). 
Consistent with other research we hypothesize that the more selective a host country’s 
immigration policy, the higher the incomes of immigrant to that country. Nevertheless, we 
expect that controlling for time since migration would weaken or altogether eliminate the 
effect. 
Hypotheses regarding the effects on economic integration of the other dimensions of 
policy are less well founded. While we would anticipate that countries that have settlement 
policies providing more assistance to immigrants in the form of financial support, housing, 
and language and job training, the small amount of existing research does not support this 
expectation. A comparison of Russian immigrants to Israel, which provides substantial 
support to newcomers, and Canada, which relies on NGOs to provide such support only to 
the neediest immigrants, found that those settling in Canada attained both higher earnings 
and higher status occupations (Lewin-Epstein et al., 2003). However, the two-country design 
makes it difficult to disentangle the effects of selectivity, which is greater in Canada with its 
point system, from the effect of settlement policy. We therefore hypothesize that over a large 
range of countries and in the presence of a control for selectivity, immigrants to countries 
providing more settlement assistance should have higher earnings. 
While not strictly within the realm of immigration policy, the combination of 
unemployment insurance, income redistribution, and social services and assistance that 
comprise a welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990) likely reinforce the effects of more 
direct governmental efforts at immigrant settlement assistance. (see Kogan, 2004). To 
capture the importance of welfare regimes for the success of immigrants in the labor market 
we include the following characteristics of the social security systems of the analyzed 
countries: the percentage of GDP spent on social security expenses, and the degree of full 
access to the social security system for family members. 
 To our knowledge, no existing research addresses the effects of the remaining dimensions 
of immigration policy identified by Lynch and Simon (2003): admissions rates, the 
prevalence of illegal migration, the ease with which immigrants become naturalized citizens, 
the degree of internal regulation of immigrants, and the amount of discretion afforded 
immigration authorities. However, their arguments have persuaded us that such factors may 
influence the success of immigrants’ economic integration. We therefore add to our Models 
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the following characteristics of the migration policies of the countries included in the 
analysis: the percentage of immigrants in the total population; net migration rate; the inflow 
of asylum seekers; the percentage of immigrants with a recognized status; the proportion of 
immigrants that are naturalized; whether or not a country is a member of the Schengen 
agreement4, whether or not immigration is regulated by an annual quota system, the level of 
granting of long-term residence rights to immigrants; and the recognition of family 
reunification as a  principle or concept in immigration law, including the right of family 
reunification for non-married couples and family members beyond spouse and children. 
Because the functioning of a labor market and its openness to immigrants can influence 
the effectiveness of immigration policies, we also include characteristics of the labor markets 
of the countries in the analysis. We incorporate measures of the following labor market 
characteristics: the percent of immigrant workers in the labor force; the overall 
unemployment rate; the unemployment rate among male immigrants; the self-employment 
rate of immigrants; the labor market participation rate of non-migrants; the labor market 
participation rate of immigrants; and the percentage of immigrants with a tertiary education. 
 
Data, Measures, and Methods 
 
Data Sources. While there is a strong case to be made for a comparative study of the 
impact of immigration policy on the socioeconomic success of immigrants, obtaining data on 
a sufficient number of countries turns out to be a difficult matter. An ideal research design to 
address the questions raised here would involve having large samples for all countries that 
are net receivers of immigrants to capture sufficient numbers of immigrants, detailed 
measurement on the necessary variables that is exactly comparable across countries, and 
surveys that are repeated frequently (preferably on an annual basis) over a long period of 
time, at least a decade. While such data requirements might be met for a few countries, they 
cannot be perfectly met at this time for the large-scale comparison we propose. Our choice of 
data, therefore, represents a compromise to maximize both the number of countries 
represented and measurement detail for certain key variables. 
Data on the new immigration countries of Europe were obtained from the European Social 
Survey (ESS).5 Although originally designed as a survey of attitudes and values, the ESS has 
a rich array of social background and socioeconomic variables to support research of the kind 
described here. Interviewing for Round I of the ESS took place during 2002 for 21 of the 23 
countries participating, thus making the data current. What makes this survey particularly 
attractive for purposes of this research is that it is designed to be longitudinal, in this case a 
sequence of cross section, with Round II interviewing scheduled to take place in late 2004. 
While the sample sizes in each round are relatively small for research on immigrants, we plan 
to expand the sample size by incorporating additional waves of data as they become 
available.  
The quality of the data in the ESS are enhanced by the care taken by the research team to 
devise equivalent sampling strategies in all countries and to translate the source 
questionnaire, originally designed in English, into all relevant languages in the countries 
covered by the survey. Immigrants are included in the sampling frame of each country, since 
the sampling frame includes all persons age 15 or over who reside in private households 
regardless of citizenship, nationality, or language. A valuable feature of the ESS is inclusion 
of detailed measures of variables key to this analysis that are not collapsed in the public use 
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version of the data. Thus exact country of birth, a three-digit occupational code that can be 
converted into an internationally comparable measure, a measure of financial status in the 
form of household income, years since migration (albeit in collapsed form), and citizenship 
are all available in the ESS, along with the usual demographic measures such as age, sex, 
educational attainment, and marital status. This permits us to estimate properly specified 
status attainment Models at the individual level. 
Other sources of European data we surveyed all had just one advantage over the ESS: 
larger sample sizes. In all other respects, they were inferior. One promising data project that 
in the future will provide high-quality large sample data on member countries of the 
European Union is the European Union Labor Force Survey (EULFS) coordinated by 
Eurostat (2002). The main defect of this survey is that, for confidentiality reasons, microdata 
are not yet available (Charlier and Franco, 2001) so that researchers must rely on the use of 
large customized Tables, which restrict the number of variables available for Modeling. In 
addition, the EULFS includes no measure of either respondent earnings or household income, 
except for a few countries after 2000, variables are not always measured consistently, as in 
the case of education after 1997, and variables relevant to research on migration were not 
always collected, particularly country of birth.  
Data for the United States comes from the March 2002 Labor Force Survey (US Bureau of 
the Census), while the Canadian data comes from the Public Use Microdata File of the 1996 
census (Statistics Canada). Both of these surveys provide measures of all variables available 
in the ESS, though in some cases with less detail. However, the sample sizes of these surveys 
are considerably greater than those available in the ESS. Therefore, we drew a simple 
random sample from each of 3000 cases. While this represents a considerable sacrifice of 
data, it prevents the two larger samples from dominating statistical inference in our Models.  
Given our interest in the functioning of the labor market, the subpopulation used here is 
restricted to immigrant and native-born men and women age 20 to 64 who had non-zero 
incomes. Given the relatively small representation of immigrants in most of the countries 
used in the analysis, we were not able to estimate separate Models for men and women. To 
partially adjust for this, we include the main effect of sex as a control.  
Measuring Immigrant Status. Immigrant status is simply measured by respondent’s 
country of birth. Those who were not born in the surveyed country are classified as 
immigrants, while those who were born in the surveyed country are considered to be 
indigenous. While simple and conventional, this approach to measurement gives rise to a 
number of problems, which we cannot be solve with neither the data sets used here nor with 
other available cross-national data. First of all, due to the greater geographical mobility of 
managers and professionals since 1945 related to employment in business and government, 
the number of children born outside their parents’ native country may have increased. For 
instance the child of a Dutch employee of Shell might be born in Africa or the child of a US 
soldier might be born in Germany. One can argue that by failing to make this distinction, we 
overestimate the number of better-integrated immigrants. On the other hand, this failure 
highlights a problem of defining immigrants: how many years must a child of a Dutch 
employee of Shell born in Africa live outside the Netherlands before he or she becomes a 
‘real’ immigrant? Would such children define themselves as immigrants? Would other 
members of Dutch society define them as immigrants? 
A second definitional problem is related to changing national boundaries and is 
particularly relevant to Europe. Due to the changes in the political frontiers after 1945 (the 
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annexation to Poland of some formerly German territory; the extension of Russia at the 
expense of Polish territory) and due to the subsequent displacement of large populations an 
unknown number of ‘indigenous’ persons would be measured as being born outside their 
country, e.g. a German born in Königsbergen (East Prussia), now living in Germany or a 
Pole born in Lvov (Ukraine), now living in Poland. Again, one can argue that by failing to 
make this distinction, we overestimate the number of better-integrated immigrants. On the 
other hand, this failure highlights a conceptual problem in defining an immigrant: for how 
many generations must a Polish family live in Russia before it is no longer considered 
Polish? This issue also extends to the large number of immigrants originating in the former 
European colonies as well as from independent Third World countries who migrated to 
Europe or North America. Their children, born in these immigrant-receiving countries, are 
conventionally measured as native born and thus not considered to be immigrants. However, 
typically in these countries this second generation will continue to be considered to be 
“immigrants” and have a lower level of integration in education and the labor market within 
the receiving countries (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). Again, one can argue that by failing to 
make the distinction between first- and second-generation immigrants, we may underestimate 
the lack of integration of immigrants. On the other hand, this failure highlights the problem 
of defining immigrants noted above: for how many generations must a Hindu family live in 
the UK before they are no longer considered to be Indian? 
Given the sampling procedures applied in constructing the data sets used here, they are 
unlikely to include illegal immigrants, although illegal immigrants are prominent in the 
popular images of immigrants in these highly developed countries, particularly Latin 
Americans crossing the Mexican border to the USA and North and Sub Saharan Africans 
arriving on the Italian island of Lampadusa from Libya or landing on the beaches of southern 
Spain. These illegal immigrants also are important in the labor markets of these developed 
countries, although less visible at the bottom and most vulnerable, as attested by the recent 
tragic fires in Paris that killed many illegal immigrants. One can argue that by failing to 
include illegal immigrants in surveys, we overestimate the integration of immigrants. 
Therefore our results should be seen as an indication of the labor market attainments of 
official immigrants or of illegal immigrants who has become official by means of such 
mechanisms as loopholes in the law, general pardons, marriage, or fraud. 
Most refined distinctions among immigrants based on their country of birth failed due to a 
lack of sufficient numbers of immigrants from a specific country (e.g. Turkey) or a group of 
countries (e.g. South Mediterranean countries) in most surveys. In part this is a consequence 
of the problem of defining immigrants mentioned above, but it is also in part a consequence 
of selective migration between countries. We finally made the distinction among: First World 
immigrants, arriving from one a more developed country of the EU member-states (before 
the last extension), the USA, Canada, Australia or New Zealand; Second- and Third World 
immigrants, arriving from all middle- and lower-income countries; and immigrants from 
countries with long-standing dependency relations with a country of immigration. These are 
in the first place countries that have been or still are colonies (for instance India for the UK, 
the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America for Spain, and Brazil for Portugal) or 
dependent countries (Puerto Rico and the Philippines for the USA). But in the case of 
Austria, Germany, the UK and Sweden they also included those countries that were a part of 
their former territories (for example Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the former Yugoslavia 
for Austria; Norway for Sweden). In our data set, this category of immigrants from colonies 
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existed only for Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, UK, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden 
and the USA, although in some cases the number involved are small.  
Measures of Other Socioeconomic Characteristics. Our dependent variable is the log 
household income expressed in Euros. This household income includes all money income of 
a household, irrespectively of the source (paid labor, state subsidies, social security, 
pensions, etc). It is not corrected for household size, since this variable is included among the 
independent variables. In the case of Canada and the US, the local currency was converted 
into Euros at the prevailing exchange rate at the time of the surveys. Household income is not 
an ideal index of immigrant success in the labor market, since it is only partially made up of 
earnings from employment, and may include income from such sources as self-employed 
earnings, transfer payments, and returns on investments, and it is in part a function of the 
number of wage earners in the household. We would argue, however, that in the case of 
immigrants, the total household income is a better indicator of their ability to adapt 
economically in the host country than individual earnings from employment. In any case, few 
immigrants are likely to obtain a substantial portion of their household incomes from sources 
other than individual earnings, and we are at least able to control for household size.  
Size of place of residence has three categories indicating residence in either a large city or 
one of its suburbs, a small city or town, or a village or rural area. 
Educational highest level is measured by the ISCED scale (OECD 1999a), which runs 
from the lowest level (primary education not completed) to the highest level (second stage of 
tertiary education). In most countries included in the analysis this measure of highest 
education better reflects educational attainment than years of schooling, since the educational 
systems in many countries are characterized by a dual-track structure.  
The socioeconomic index is based on the occupation of the respondent and indicates the 
social status or general attractiveness of his or her occupation. Detailed occupational codes in 
the data sets were recoded into International Socioeconomic Index (ISEI) scores 
(Ganzeboom et al. 1992). If the respondent was not employed and thus had no occupation to 
code into the ISEI (in most cases because the respondent was a housewife), we replaced the 
missing value by the average ISEI score for that country. We also added a dichotomous 
variable, scored one if the respondent had no occupation, zero otherwise. 
Country-level Indicators of Immigration Policy and Labor Force Characteristics. 
Consistent with the dimensions of immigration policy discussed above, we have 
identified the following specific indicators of immigration policy that are consistently 
measured in each of the 23 countries: 
- Percentage of foreigners in the total population in 2000 (a combination of the total 
population in 2000 (US Central Intelligence Agency, 2004) and the stock of 
foreigners (OECD 2000)). 
- Net in migration rate of a country (Immigration – Emigration: CIA World 
Factbook). 
- Inflow of asylum seekers in 2001 (the inflow (OECD 2002) per 1000 inhabitants).  
- Percentage of immigrants with a recognized status as a percentage of all 
immigration decisions made in 2001 OECD (2002). 
- Degree of naturalization of foreigners: the number of naturalization decisions 
(Eurostat, 2001; OECD, 2003) as a percentage of the stock of foreigners. 
- Membership in the Schengen Agreement. 
- Immigration regulated via annual quota system.6  
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- Skill-selective immigration policy (MPG, 2004 Country Reports).7  
- Right of family reunification for non-married couples: are cohabiters and 
registered partners (often homosexual) eligible for family reunion? (OECD, 2000; 
MPG, 2004). 
- Recognition of family reunification as principle or concept in immigration law 
(OECD 2000). 
- Right of family reunification beyond spouse and children, e.g. parents, siblings, 
others (OECD, 2000; MPG, 2004). 
The following are comparable country-level indicators of the labor market for foreigners 
in the 23 countries:  
- Stock of the foreign labor force as a percentage of the total labor force (OECD, 
2002). 
- Overall unemployment rate in 2002 (CIA World Factbook). 
- Unemployment rate of male foreigners in 2001.  
- Difference in unemployment rate between foreigners & nationals - Male 
(2000/01) or between Foreigner UE rate & National UE rate: OECD (2002). 
- Self-employment rate of foreigners: percentage of self-employed foreigners in 
non-agricultural activities relative to their share in total labor force OECD (2002). 
- Labor market participation of nationals (OECD, 2003).  
- Labor market participation rate of foreigners (OECD, 2003). 
- Difference in labor market participation rates of nationals and foreigners  
- Percentage foreigners with a third level education (OECD, 2001). 
In addition to these macro-indicators related to immigration policies and 
characteristics of the labor market for immigrants, we also use a few general indicators of 
the economic prosperity and the social security expenses of the analyzed countries: 
- GNI per capita in 2002 in US dollars (UNICEF, 2004). 
- Social expenses as a percentage of GDP in 1998 (OECD, 1999b). 
Details on the actual values for these country-level variables are provided in Table 3. 
Models and Estimation Methods. For the core of our analyses we use a multilevel 
Modeling approach (MLwiN 1.1, Rasbash et al. 2000), which is generally considered to be 
the best method to assess the effects of macro-level characteristics on individual behavior 
(Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Hox, 2002), because this method takes the nested structure of the 
macro and micro data into account. As consequences of history and socialization, 
respondents with certain characteristics are not randomly distributed among the analyzed 
countries, but are ‘nested’ within specific countries. If this ‘nested’ structure of individuals 
within countries is not appropriately taken into account, the estimation of effects may be 
biased.  
A second advantage of multilevel analysis is the possibility of replacing country indicators 
with variables that are assumed to produce different outcomes between countries, such as 
immigration policies or labor market characteristics. In this way multilevel analysis takes 
into account that the number of macro-level units is restricted (23 countries in our case), and 
uses this number via empirical Bayes methods to estimate the significance of the effects of 
the macro-variables on individual outcomes. With 23 countries, we have enough units at 
level-2 to make reliable estimates in a random coefficient Model (Snijders & Bosker, 1999: 
43-44). 
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A third advantage of multilevel analysis is that it makes it possible to test whether effects 
of independent variables at the individual level are significantly different between higher 
level contexts (in our case countries). In our analysis these tests for differential effects are 
important, because they show the degree to which effects on immigrant integration are 
county-specific and cannot be explained by general processes, such as a specifically designed 
immigration policy or a more or less open labor market for immigrants. 
A disadvantage is that the multilevel software we use (MLwiN 2.0) eliminates cases with 
a missing value on one of the included variables from the analysis on a listwise basis. While 
this poses only minor problems for the level-1 data, it represents a severe problem if a macro-
variable for a country is missing, as in our case for Poland, for which nearly all macro-
indicators on labor market and foreigners are missing, and Luxemburg, for which the status 
recognition variable is missing (see Table 3). Another disadvantage of this multilevel 
software is that the handling of weights is not very reliable and still debated. Therefore we 
refrain from applying weights in the multilevel analysis, but we used design weights for the 
descriptive and regression analyses reported in Tables 1 and 28.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 shows means or percentages and their standard deviations of the dependent and 
independent variables separately for non-migrants, First World immigrants, Second- and 
Third world immigrants and colonies immigrants both for our full data set and for each 
country. If there are fewer then 20 immigrants in a cell, values are not reported, and all 
values are weighted using the design weights assuring intracountry representativeness.  
In interpreting these means and standard deviations it is important to keep in mind that 
immigrants from colonies, the First World, and even from the Second and Third World are 
mostly immigrants to higher income countries, which may bias their averages upward. This 
can be seen in the overall figures in the top panel for log household income, educational 
level, and the socioeconomic index, which are all higher for the First World immigrants than 
for the non-migrant population. For immigrants from colonies this discrepancy between their 
averages and those of the non-migrant population is less pronounced, but is still evident in 
their higher educational level, possibly a consequence of a brain drain from the periphery to 
the center. This is even true for the Second and Third World immigrants: they have a slightly 
higher educational level then the non-migrant population. In part these higher averages of the 
immigrant groups might be caused by sampling methods that select official and relatively 
well-integrated immigrants, as discussed earlier. But these higher scores might also be a 
function of differences in the ages, household size and size of place of residence of the 
various immigrant and non-migrant populations. Straightforwardly comparing averages of 
these two populations can be misleading, because differences in important background 
variables are not taken into account. For that reason we will not comment on Table 1 more 
extensively, but instead will focus on the results of regression analyses presented in Table 2, 
which allow us to take the variations in the important background variables of various 
immigrant and non-migrant populations into account, including variations in countries of 
immigration. For that same reason we refrain from discussing the differences in means 
between various immigrant and non-migrant populations for each country separately. We 
only note that there is a large amount of variation between countries among these groups, 
which might indicate that macro-level differences between the countries might be relevant. 
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Model 1 of Table 2 is the simplest equation with log-household income as the dependent 
variable and dummy variables representing First World immigrants, Second and Third World 
immigrants and immigrants from colonies as independent variables, using non-migrants as 
the reference group, along with dummies for all countries, using the USA as the reference 
group. The results for this first equation already show the importance of controlling for 
country of immigration9. If we do so, First World immigrants no longer have a significantly 
higher household income, but immigrants from colonies still do, while Second and Third 
World immigrants have a lower household income. Because these various immigrant-
populations end up in different countries (for instance the USA has a relatively large number 
of Second and Third World immigrants, but has also the highest average household income), 
controlling for these differences in immigrant destinations reveals one way in which the 
straightforward comparison in Table 1 is misleading. If one takes the country of immigration 
into account, Second and Third World immigrants have lower household incomes than both 
the non-migrant population and other immigrant types. 
Model 2 of Table 2 also takes differences in background characteristics and the interaction 
between gender and the marital status dummies into account. The values of these parameters 
are as one would expect. Higher household incomes are associated with more education, a 
larger household size, being married, and being older. Based on the gender-marital status 
interactions, we can see that single males have lower household incomes than females, but 
this difference disappears for married males. However, the most interesting results for us are 
that the income differences between First World immigrants, immigrants from colonies and 
the non-migrant population become nonsignificant. The higher household income of these 
two immigrant groups in Table 1 is fully a consequence of their favorable background 
characteristics. On the other hand, immigrants from the Second- and Third World have a 
much lower household income on average than non-migrants and the other immigrant-types 
in the same countries and with the same characteristics. Taking into account these 
background variables doubles their disadvantage in household income (from -.06 in Model 1 
to -.12 in Model 2).  
This disadvantage in household income might be explained by differences in effects of 
these background variables across the various immigrant-types and non-migrants. For 
instance, the disadvantage in household income might be caused by a lower rate of return 
to education among Second and Third World immigrants. We explore this possible 
explanation in Model 3 by adding all significant interaction between the three immigrant-
type dummy variables and the background characteristic to Model 2. The results of 
Model 3 show indeed that a number of these background characteristics have different 
effects for immigrants, especially for those originating in  Second and Third World 
countries. The education of Second and Third World immigrants indeed has a lower rate 
of return. In addition, being married lowers household income, while being an older male 
increases the household income of Second and Third World immigrants. But these 
differential effects of the background variables do not explain the lower average 
household income of this group of immigrants: to the contrary taking these differential 
effects into account only reduced the average household income further (from .12 in 
Model 2 to .23 in Model 3). Even adjusting for the lower return on education and the 
higher return on age and gender among Second and Third World immigrants, they still 
have lower average household incomes on average than comparable non-migrants in their 
host countries. 
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But the Second and Third World immigrants are not the only immigrants with lower 
average household incomes than comparable non-migrants. Taking into account the 
higher rate of return of age for First World immigrants and the positive effect of marriage 
for immigrants from colonies, these two immigrant groups also have lower household 
incomes than comparable non-migrants, The equal household income of First World and 
colony immigrants based on Model 2 is spurious: Model 3 shows that in reality it is lower 
than that of comparable younger, unmarried non-migrants. 
In Model 4 we test whether or not there are country differences in the effect of 
belonging to one of the immigrant types. We do this by adding the significant interactions 
between country and immigrant-type10. Model 4 shows that Second and Third World 
immigrants in the Czech Republic, Canada and the Netherlands have lower household 
incomes than the already lower household income of comparable Second and Third 
World immigrants in the other countries. Also First World immigrants in the Netherlands 
have lower household incomes than the already lower household incomes of comparable 
First World immigrants in the other countries, but First World immigrants in Canada 
have higher household incomes than their counterparts in other countries. Finally, 
immigrants from the Dutch colonies have higher household incomes than comparable 
immigrants from colonies in other countries. Thus there is some variation in the 
household income of comparable immigrants in the various countries, but this doesn’t 
account for the lower average household incomes of all types of immigrants in these 
countries compared to equivalent non-migrants. 
One might argue that the main problem for immigrants is to obtain a good job instead 
of earning a higher household income, since higher incomes are ordinarily associated 
with higher status jobs. Obtaining such a good job is more difficult for immigrants 
because labor markets are often more closed to outsiders (migrants) than to insiders (non-
migrants). But if immigrants are able to obtain a job at a certain level, they are likely to 
earn more or less the same amount as non-migrants. We test this by adding the 
socioeconomic status of their occupation to Model 4, together with a dummy variable 
scored one for those persons who had no occupation and the significant  interactions 
between these two status indicators and gender and immigrants. The results are shown in 
Model 5. Although, as expected, socioeconomic status has a positive effect on household 
income and not being in the labor force decreases household income, the negative effect 
of being an immigrant of any type on household income is hardly affected by the 
inclusion of  socioeconomic status. In other words, immigrants in all highly developed 
countries have lower household incomes on average than non-migrants with the same 
background characteristics and working in jobs with the same status. This deficit in the 
household income of immigrants is nearly twice as large for equivalent immigrants 
coming from Second and Third World countries. And even then, in some countries, such 
as Canada, the Czech Republic and the Netherlands, the household incomes of Second 
and Third World immigrants are even lower than those of equivalent Second and Third 
World immigrants in the other developed countries. 
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The Effects of Immigration Policies and Welfare Regime 
 
Table 4 reports parameter estimates for two multilevel models. The first of these, 
labeled Model 5A,  is based on Model 5 in Table 4, with two exceptions. The first 
difference between Model 5 and 5A is that we include no explicit country dummies in 
Model 5A, because differences in the average income level between countries is now 
included into the multilevel equations as a set of random constants, as one can see in 
these two equations: 
 
Household incomeij = β0ij + β1 (individual variable)ij + e ij (error-term)ij  (1)   
β0ij = γ00 + v0j + u0ij        (2) 
The variance in the constant (β0ij) is divided into an individual part (u0ij) and a country 
part (v0j). At the bottom of Table 4 we see that there are still unexplained variances at 
both the individual level and at the country level, although the amount of unexplained 
variance is larger at the individual level than at the country level. This should not be 
surprising, since there is often more within country variance in income than between 
country variance. 
The second difference between Model 5 and Model 5A is that there are no interaction 
terms for country by immigrant type. In Model 5A we assume that the effect of 
immigrant type is equal in all countries. Multilevel analysis allows for testing the 
significance of the variation in the effect of a lower level variable between the various 
units at a higher level, in this case the variation of the effect of the independent variables 
between countries.  
We may modify the model represented by equations 1-2 by relaxing the constraint that 
the coefficients of the individual-level variables be equal across countries: 
β1ij= β1 + u1j         (3) 
 
The difference with the former model is that β1ij now can vary between countries j and 
the amount of this country variance is expressed by u1j. We can measure the significance 
of this intercountry variation by computing the difference in the -2*log likelihood of the 
equation without varying effects of a certain independent variable (fixed-effects model) 
and the equation that permits varying effects of that independent variable at the country-
level (random-effects model). The larger the decrease of -2*log likelihood, the greater the 
variability of the effect of that independent variable between countries (see Snijder & 
Bosker, 1999: 89). This differences in -2*log likelihood for each separate independent 
variable of Model 5A is given in the first column of Table 5 (the more negative, the 
larger the decrease). The significance of the differences in -2*log likelihood also depends 
on degrees of freedom. In the case of two extra variables (β1, u1j) represented in Table 5, 
the number of degrees of freedom is 2. If these differences in -2*log likelihood are 
nonsignificant it does not mean that the parameter of a single country (for instance 
Holland) does not deviate from those of the other countries, but it does mean that this 
parameter is equal in a majority of the countries.  
The first column of Table 5 shows that the effects of the three immigrant type dummy 
variables on household income hardly differ between societies, but that the effects of 
education, household size, marital status, age, residence size and occupational 
socioeconomic status on household income differ substantially. We will not further 
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analyze the country differences of these effects, but focus on two country-specific effects, 
which are related to immigrants: 2&3-worldmigrant and the interaction of 2&3-
worldmigrant with education. Their differences in the -2*log likelihood of the equation 
without country varying effects of these variables (fixed-effects model) and the equation 
with varying effects (random-effects model) is large enough to justify further analyses. 
In the next step we add to Model 5A each of the macro-level characteristics of the 
countries separately. The first column of Table 6 shows the decrease in -2*log likelihood 
by the addition of each of the macro-level characteristics in comparison with the -2*log 
likelihood of Model 5A, at the cost of one degree of freedom. This first column of Table 
6 shows that differences of household income within and between the analyzed countries 
can partly be explained by the GNI per capita, the stock of foreign-born labor force, the 
unemployment rate of male immigrants, the self-employment rate of immigrants, the 
labor force participation rate of natives and immigrants and the difference between these 
rates, the percentage of foreigners with tertiary education, and the number of years of 
long-term residence rights. In the second column of Table 6 we add the interaction-
variable between a macro-characteristic and 2&3-worldmigrant dummy variable to the 
equation, which already includes the main-effect of that macro-characteristic. This 
second column of Table 6 shows the decrease in -2*log likelihood by the addition of the 
interaction-variable in comparison with the -2*log likelihood of a model with the macro-
characteristic, at the cost of one degree of freedom. This interaction-variable measures 
the difference between the effect of a macro-characteristic on household income of 2&3-
worldmigrants in comparison with the effect of that macro-characteristic on household 
income of non-2&3-worldmigrants. The second column of Table 6 shows that only the 
addition of the interaction-variable participation rate foreigners*2&3-worldmigrants 
decreases -2*log likelihood significantly. In the last column of Table 6 we add the 
interaction-variable between each macro-level characteristic and the interaction of 2&3-
worldmigrant with educational level to the equation. This permits us to assess the degree 
to which the macro-level characteristics affect variation across these countries in returns 
to education among immigrants from Second and Third World countries. The third 
column of Table 6 shows that the participation rate foreigners, difference in participation 
rate nationals and foreigners and net migration rate decrease -2*log likelihood 
significantly. 
In the next step we add all these significant macro-characteristics and interaction-
variables to the equation of Model 5A. We tried various combinations with the aim to 
delete the spurious ones and to maintain the significant ones. This is important because a 
number of the macro-characteristics correlate quite strongly, producing all the usual 
consequences of multicollinearity for model interpretation. Model 6 of Table 4 shows the 
best results of this addition and adjustment procedure. Due to missing values for Poland 
and Luxemburg on labor market participation and status recognition they are deleted 
from this final analysis. 
The first important result is the strong effect of the participation rate in the labor 
market of both immigrants and the native born on the average individual household 
income of a country. The more immigrants participate at the labor market of a country, 
the higher the overall average household income. As well, the more natives participate at 
the labor market of a country in comparison with immigrants, the higher the overall 
average household income. Finally, high labor force participation rates of foreigners 
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increase the household income of the better-educated Second and Third World 
immigrants more than that of less educated Second and Third World immigrants or other 
types of immigrants. However, this also means that the overall return to education among 
all Second and Third World migrants becomes even lower then it already was. 
The second interesting result is that a high rate of self-employment among immigrants 
actually decreases the overall average household income. A possible explanation is that a 
high level of self-employment among immigrants is an indicator of a large number of 
marginal shops and firms, which yield only small profits and thus low household income. 
A portion of these small profits might also be reinvested in the shops or firms, further 
reducing household income. However, it is important to realize that this negative effect of 
self-employment is observed after controlling for the labor market participation rate 
among immigrants. 
The third result shown in the second column of Table 4 is that the length of long-term 
residence rights granted to immigrants is negatively associated with overall average 
household income. A possible explanation is that granting only short-term residence 
rights initially makes it possible for the authorities to quickly remove those immigrants 
who earn low incomes, typically by failing to find employment, by not granting a renewal 
of the short-term residence permit. As well, and perhaps even more important in practice, 
not having an immediate right to long-term residence may motivate immigrants to attain 
as soon as possible an income-level which gives them the right to renew a short-term 
residence permit. However, it is important to realize that this negative effect of long-term 
residence policy is found after controlling for the immigrant labor market participation 
rate. 
A fourth interesting result is that all other macro-level variables representing policy 
alternatives have no significant effect on either overall average household income or the 
income of immigrants alone. A number of these policies are hotly debated in various 
countries as possible mechanisms to regulate migration streams and to improve the 
socioeconomic position of those who are allowed to migrate. For instance skill-selective 
immigration policies or restrictions on family reunification are often debated as means to 
improve the quality of immigrants that are admitted, but in this analysis we find no effect 
of these characteristics on average household income.  
The fifth interesting finding is the nonsignificant effects of the percentage of 
immigrants in a country, the net migration rate, or the inflow of asylum seekers on the 
average household income. This suggests that the level of migration itself does not reduce 
the economic success of a country, at least to the extent that it is expressed in the average 
household income of the population. It only does so, if a high level of immigration leads 
to a low level of participation in the labor market by immigrants, as we have seen above. 
But our analysis shows that it is not the level of migration itself that might have a 
negative influence on the average household income, but that the labor force participation 
rate of immigrants is a central problem in highly developed countries. It is also clear that 
not all highly developed countries of Europe and North America are as successful in 
achieving a high labor force participation rate among immigrants. For example, compare 
the 63.1 percent and 69.5 percent of Sweden and the Netherlands with the 89.5 percent 
and the 85.6 percent of Switzerland and the USA. 
Yet a sixth result of our analysis, based on a comparison of the two columns of Table 
4, is that few parameters associated with the individual characteristics have changed by 
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the addition of the macro characteristics, with the variables ‘2&3-worldmigrant’ and the 
‘2&3-worldmigrant*education’ as exceptions. The negative parameter of 2&3-
worldmigrant becomes less negative after this addition, which can be interpreted to mean 
that specifically for them a high level of labor market participation improves their 
household income. This means that the household incomes of Second and Third World 
and First World migrants with the same individual characteristics are equal in countries 
with the same level of labor market participation. Note that by adding the macro-
characteristics the parameter of the First World migrant dummy variable becomes as 
negative as that of the Second and Third World dummy, suggesting that the observed 
differences of labor market integration of First World and Second and Third World 
migrants can be fully explained by the differences in their individual characteristics (age, 
education, family-size) and by the macro-characteristics of the countries to which they 
migrated. Also the negative parameter of the variable ‘2&3-worldmigrant*education’ 
become more negative, indicating that the educational level of Second and Third World 
migrants has far less value in the labor market than that of other immigrants or of the 
native-born population. Note that when we control for important individual 
characteristics, First World and colonial immigrants do not have a lower return on their 
education. The positive parameter of ‘participation rate foreigners*2&3-
worldmigrants*educational level’, which is equal in size to the negative parameter of 
‘2&3-worldmigrant*education’, shows that only Second and Third World migrants in 
countries with a high labor market participation are able to neutralize the generally lower 
return to education among Second and Third World migrants. Note also that these Second 
and Third World migrants still have lower household incomes irrespective of their level 
of education or labor market participation.  
That the parameters of the individual characteristics change little with the addition of 
the macro-variables to the model gives rise to a final conclusion: the effects of most 
individual characteristics are not strongly influenced by the immigration policies of these 
countries. The last column of Table 5 shows this more clearly: the between-country 
variation in the effect of the various immigrant types goes effectively to zero. That is, 
after taking into account the self-employment rate of immigrants, the difference in the 
labor force participation rates of immigrants and natives, the granting of long-term 
residence rights and the three way interaction among the Second and Third World 
dummy, the immigrant participation rate, and education, between country differences in 
the household incomes of immigrants disappear. Although these macro-characteristics are 
extremely important (their inclusion results in a decline of -2*log likelihood of 4639 with 
only 5 degrees of freedom), between-country differences in migration policy and 
immigrant characteristics cannot fully explain the lower household incomes of all 
immigrants in the highly developed countries. An important part of these lower 
household incomes of immigrants and the lower return on education among Second and 
Third World immigrant are common to all these highly developed countries, although as 
we mentioned above, this does not mean that the parameter of one extreme country (for 
instance Holland) cannot deviate from that of another extreme country (for instance the 
USA), but it does mean that this parameter is equal across the range of countries.  
 
Conclusions 
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We have found that migrants from Second and Third World countries moving to 
Europe and North America have lower incomes than the native born, and that this income 
gap widens further after we controlling for individual characteristics such as age, 
education, and marital status. In fact controlling for these factors doubles the income gap 
between Second and Third World immigrants and comparable natives. To understand this 
partly counter-intuitive result, one should remember that as a consequence of the nature 
of the data sets used in this analysis, illegal immigrants are for the most part excluded. 
Therefore our results should be interpreted as applying to the labor market attainment of 
official immigrants or of illegal immigrants who have become official. This lower 
income for immigrants is not only true for Second and Third World immigrants, but also 
for First World immigrants, but only after controlling for the other individual factors. The 
income deficit of Second and Third World immigrants to comparable natives is more or 
less double that of First World immigrants. One could argue that the income deficit of 
First World immigrants indicates a general penalty of migration: moving to another 
country generally results in a loss in the capacity to earn an income equal to comparable 
natives. However, the Second and Third World immigrants experience a larger loss in 
earning capacity than First World immigrants. This larger loss might be caused by the 
greater cultural, social and economic distance between their country of origin and the 
country of destination, which decreases the applicability of their human capital. Another 
explanation of this larger loss might be the lower quality of education in the countries of 
origin in comparison with that available in the First World, which means that our control 
for the human capital factors is insufficient. A third explanation of this larger loss might 
be discrimination against immigrants, particularly immigrants of another racial 
background, in the labor markets of host countries. This discrimination may not 
necessarily be ideologically motivated (“I despise Chinese”), but can appear 
economically rational (“Migrants use our language less well than equally educated 
natives”; “My clients prefer blond sales personnel”; “My employees are more likely to 
listen to a native boss”), or can be the unintended consequence of protection of workers 
by labor market regulations and social security systems by calling for a sharper 
distinction between insiders and outsiders.  
The returns to education are lower on average for Second and Third World immigrants 
than for comparable natives and First World immigrants. The three explanations of the 
larger income deficit of second- and Third World immigrants offered above (distance, 
quality, and discrimination) might be applicable here as well. However lower returns to 
education can also be politically risky, because such lower returns may prompt 
disillusionment among the better-educated immigrants, who underachieve in the labor 
market in relation to their expectations based on their educational attainments. The better-
educated, but disillusioned immigrants can become most dangerous, because they have 
the cognitive means for violent action to try to change their situations, or they may 
simply move on to another country where their education has a better chance of being 
recognized.   
Cross-national variability in immigrant income is very small. Only a few countries 
show some deviation from the reference category, the United States, notably and most 
clearly the Netherlands both for its First World and Second and Third World immigrants. 
The effects of being an immigrant and of their human capital on income are not 
significantly different for all other countries.  The multilevel analysis shows the same 
 19 
 
results: there are few cross-national differences in the functioning of labor markets for 
immigrants in these countries. This underscores an important conclusion of this analysis: 
lower income among immigrants is an international phenomenon, and not just 
characteristic of a specific society, effective or ineffective policy, or leftist or rightist 
governments.  
However, according to our analysis, there are characteristics of labor markets that 
affect immigrant incomes. The higher the level of immigrant labor market participation in 
a country, the higher the overall average income. As well, the more natives participate at 
the labor market of a country in comparison with the immigrants, the higher the overall 
average household income. A possible explanation might be that a high labor force 
participation level means that a country has a low level of social security or no early 
retirement schemes which force workers to remain active at the labor market and to earn 
as much as possible to make up the shortfall in pension benefits.11 Such a labor market 
labor market might offer more opportunities for immigrants to find a profitable niche and 
earn more instead of being dependent on social welfare. However, we further find that 
high participation rates among immigrants increase the incomes of the better-educated 
Second and Third World immigrants more than those of less educated Second and Third 
World immigrants or other types of immigrants. In particular the overall returns to 
education among Second and Third World migrants is even lower in countries with high 
participation rates. 
Consistent with both the “convergence” and “gap” hypotheses of Cornelius et al. 
(1994), we found just one significant effect of migration policies: the length of granted 
long-term residence rights to foreigners of a country is negatively associated with overall 
average household income. The other migration policies measured here have no 
significant effects on the income of migrants. This does not necessarily imply that these 
regulations have no effects on the economic integration of immigrants, since, for 
example, they might affect the labor market participation of immigrants in a country and 
thus indirectly their household income, but our models were not designed to detect such 
indirect effects. Under the gap hypothesis our negative findings are consistent with a 
disjuncture between the goals and outcomes of immigration policy, while under the 
convergence hypothesis, we would expect to observe no effects of policy at the country 
level, because policies are becoming increasingly similar over time. However, 
distinguishing the two types of effects would require longitudinal data not currently 
available. 
This paper represents just a start on this line of research.  One possible direction might 
be to replace the individual macro-level policy measures with policy typologies, perhaps 
of the sort suggested by Lynch and Simon (2003), under the assumption that it is a 
combination of various policies and labor market characteristics that determine economic 
outcomes for immigrants and not a set of isolated characteristics. The present analysis 
considers only household income as an outcome, but immigration policies might instead 
influence labor market participation by immigrants or related outcomes such as their 
unemployment or use of welfare benefits instead such measures of attainment as income 
or occupational status. Perhaps more important is the analysis of the labor market 
achievements of the second-generation children of immigrants, because that is the 
decisive generation which should successfully integrate into the economy and society of 
the host country. (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). Unfortunately, good comparative data on the 
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success and failure of the second generation within the European Union are not available. 
However, a cross-national study initiated by Heath & Cheung (2006) using available 
national statistics on labor market achievement of the second generation yielded quit 
negative results for the children of immigrants to the countries of continental Europe, in 
contrast to positive results for those living in Australia, Canada and the USA. Similar 
results were obtained for the scholastic achievement of second-generation immigrant 
students in countries of Europe and the Pacific Rim by Levels & Dronkers (2005). They 
found that second generation students from less developed countries of Latin America, 
North Africa, and West Asia achieved considerably lower math scores than those 
students whose parent were native born, especially in the smaller European countries like 
Belgium, Denmark & Switzerland. Such results undermine any optimism concerning 
prospects for the economic, social and cultural integration of Second and Third World 
migrants and their children into European societies in the near future.  
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Notes
                                                 
1
 This research literature is far too voluminous to cite in its entirety. Some representative 
work is cited in Albas and Nee (2003) for the United States, Li (2003) for Canada, and 
Zimmermann (2005) for various European countries.  
2
 Jeffrey Reitz has been particularly active in promoting research that examines 
organizing a conference on the topic in 2001 and editing a special issue of the 
International Migration Review (see Reitz, 2002 for the introduction to the issue) and 
editing a book (Reitz, 2003) incorporating papers presented at the conference. 
3 Cornelius and his colleagues refer mainly to the policy question of controlling the 
number of immigrants entering a country, either legally or illegally. Indeed, most 
theorizing about immigration issues has been restricted to ascertaining the determinants 
of migration (Massey et al., 1998).  
4The Schengen Agreement, named for the small townn in Luxembourg in which iit was 
originally signed in 1985, is a treaty on the free flow of persons between a restricted 
number of EU member states. It came into effect in 1995, and the original signatories, 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany, were joined by Spain and 
Portugal. At the European Union summit in Amsterdam in 1997, the Schengen 
Agreement was brought under the auspices of the EU. 
5 The ESS is funded jointly by the European Commission, the European Science 
Foundation, and academic funding bodies in each of the participating countries. A 
Central Co-ordinating Team at the Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City 
University, London is led by Roger Jowell. See the project web site at 
www.europeansocialsurvey.org for further details. 
6
 Quota system here means a regulatory approach which sets a maximum limit on the 
number of work or residence permits granted in the course of one year. Non-quota 
systems are are represented by no or a fragmented migration policy, an official 
immigration moratorium, immigration on grounds of asylum, refugee, family 
reunification, ethnic origin or special skill provisions. (MPG, 2004). 
7
 This means that ex ante selection based on labor market requirements prevails. Such a 
policy is not always easy to identify as most countries have certain labor market 
considerations (e.g. companies can request special employees on basis of their skills) 
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built into their migration laws, but skill-selection usually means special a priori schemes 
which are focused on highly skilled workers.  
8
 For an overview of the issues in the case of regression models, see Winship and Radbill 
(1994). In short, their advice is to use weights only for estimates of univariate population 
parameters and in regression models in which the dependent variable is correlated with 
the weights. In our data, the correlation between the person weights and the log of 
household income is a miniscule -.034, suggesting that the lack of weights should not 
significantly bias our modeling results. 
9
 The parameters of the country dummies are more or less self-evident. Since the USA is 
the reference category and one of the richest countries, most country dummies are 
negative, particularly for the poorest countries in our sample (Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Poland). We will not comment on these country dummy parameters.  
10
 Interactions of immigrant-type dummy variables with other country dummies were 
nonsignificant and the model reestimated after deleting them. 
11
 For example, in Canada the rate of labour force participation among men age 65 and 
over dropped precipitously after the introduction of the Canada Pension Plan in the late 
1960s. Nearly half the men in this age group were in the labor force in 1946 compared to 
just over 11 percent by 1986.  
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Table 1: Means and standard deviations of the variables per type of migrant and per country  
Country 
& migrant 
N Log 
household  
income 
Age N in 
House 
Hold 
Male Educational 
Highest level  
Small place 
of residence 
Married Divorced 
/separated 
Widowed Socioeconom
ic index 
Missing 
Socioeconom
ic index 
Total             
Non-migrant 31453 4.31 
(.44) 
45.96 
(17.63) 
2.94 
(1.45) 
.51 
(.50) 
2.93 
(1.44) 
2.11 
(.83) 
.58 
(.49) 
.08 
(.27) 
.07 
(.26) 
42.22 
(17.97) 
.14 
(.34) 
1-world 
migrant 
1225 4.46 
(.39) 
48.25 
(16.02) 
2.83 
(1.40) 
.52 
(.50) 
3.35 
(1.57) 
1.96 
(.87) 
.62 
(.48) 
.11 
(.31) 
.07 
(.25) 
45.05 
(15.43) 
.17 
(.37) 
2 & 3world 
migrant 
2129 4.37 
(.42) 
41.06 
(15.37) 
3.39 
(1.60) 
.51 
(.50) 
3.05 
(1.58) 
1.61 
(.76) 
.62 
(.48) 
.07 
(.26) 
.05 
(.23) 
40.39 
(15.43) 
.19 
(.39) 
Migrant  
colonies 
253 4.38 
(.40) 
43.41 
(15.47) 
3.27 
(1.55) 
.52 
(.50) 
3.14 
(1.47) 
1.56 
(.70) 
.62 
(.49) 
.08 
(.27) 
.08 
(.27) 
42.40 
(15.78) 
.10 
(.31) 
Austria             
Non-migrant 1302 4.34 
(.30) 
44.89 
(15.98) 
3.10 
(1.46) 
.52 
(.50) 
3.31 
(1.28) 
2.06 
(.88) 
.60 
(.49) 
.08 
(.27) 
.06 
(.24) 
43.52 
(13.12) 
.09 
(.29) 
1-world 
migrant 
40 4.36 
(.29) 
45.56 
(13.59) 
2.90 
(1.33) 
.63 
(.49) 
4.08 
(1.46) 
1.82 
(.83) 
.60 
(.50) 
.10 
(.30) 
.07 
(.26) 
51.88 
(13.83) 
.07 
(.26) 
2 & 3world 
migrant 
89 4.29 
(.33) 
42.89 
(16.09) 
3.17 
(1.41) 
.49 
(.50) 
3.61 
(1.76) 
1.43 
(.73) 
.67 
(.47) 
.04 
(.20) 
.04 
(.19) 
41.51 
(15.03) 
.10 
(.30) 
Migrant K. & 
K. 
27 4.22 
(.36) 
47.40 
(17.75) 
3.06 
(1.85) 
.61 
(.50) 
3.60 
(1.64) 
1.54 
(.77) 
.64 
(.49) 
.06 
(.25) 
.05 
(.22) 
41.33 
(15.36) 
.07 
(.25) 
Belgium             
Non-migrant 1385 4.35 
(.30) 
45.79 
(17.66) 
2.82 
(1.34) 
.48 
(.50) 
3.04 
(1.49) 
2.32 
(.81) 
.55 
(.50) 
.12 
(.33) 
.07 
(.26) 
43.15 
(15.56) 
.12 
(.33) 
1-world 
migrant 
64 4.38 
(.28) 
49.26 
(14.86) 
2.78 
(1.23) 
.47 
(.50) 
3.33 
(1.74) 
1.88 
(.88) 
.66 
(.48) 
.11 
(.31) 
.03 
(.18) 
44.92 
(15.38) 
.09 
(.29) 
2 & 3world 
migrant 
48 4.39 
(.27) 
41.15 
(13.77) 
3.58 
(1.96) 
.50 
(.50) 
3.54 
(1.80) 
1.85 
(.85) 
.65 
(.48) 
.10 
(.31) 
.04 
(.20) 
41.35 
(14.81) 
.23 
(.42) 
Switzerland             
Non-migrant 1278 4.68 
(.30) 
46.40 
(16.69) 
2.83 
(1.36) 
.49 
(.50) 
3.26 
(1.04) 
2.43 
(.79) 
.62 
(.49) 
.09 
(.29) 
.04 
(.21) 
47.03 
(15.47) 
.06 
(.24) 
1-world 
migrant 
149 4.66 
(.33) 
51.49 
(13.11) 
2.58 
(1.32) 
.44 
(.50) 
3.51 
(1.36) 
2.31 
(.78) 
.68 
(.47) 
.14 
(.34) 
.06 
(.24) 
47.24 
(17.01) 
.05 
(.21) 
2 & 3world 
migrant 
108 4.62 
(.34) 
39.22 
(12.82) 
3.20 
(1.23) 
.61 
(.49) 
3.31 
(1.17) 
1.98 
(.81) 
.67 
(.47) 
.09 
(.28) 
.02 
(.15) 
43.92 
(16.17) 
.10 
(.30) 
Czech  Rep              
Non-migrant 917 3.93 
(.31) 
49.72 
(16.66) 
2.95 
(1.31) 
.50 
(.50) 
3.13 
(.84) 
2.07 
(.78) 
.66 
(.47) 
.11 
(.31) 
.10 
(.31) 
41.20 
(14.03) 
.07 
(.26) 
2 & 3world 
migrant 
44 3.72 
(.28) 
60.02 
(19.92) 
2.53 
(1.18) 
.55 
(.50) 
2.95 
(1.06) 
1.93 
(.77) 
.64 
(.49) 
.14 
(.35) 
.17 
(.38) 
37.24 
(15.23) 
.15 
(.36) 
Germany             
Non-migrant 2114 4.40 
(.31) 
48.04 
(17.00) 
2.51 
(1.25) 
.52 
(.50) 
3.39 
(1.03) 
1.92 
(.77) 
.58 
(.49) 
.10 
(.30) 
.08 
(.28) 
43.88 
(14.60) 
.08 
(.27) 
1-world 
migrant 
30 4.37 
(.19) 
46.75 
(13.86) 
2.25 
(1.35) 
.63 
(.49) 
3.75 
(1.15) 
1.79 
(.72) 
.54 
(.51) 
.29 
(.46) 
.13 
(.34) 
41.93 
(16.44) 
.08 
(.28) 
2 & 3world 
migrant 
165 4.34 
(.28) 
41.10 
(15.27) 
3.17 
(1.42) 
.52 
(.50) 
3.06 
(1.16) 
1.69 
(.65) 
.67 
(.47) 
.09 
(.29) 
.06 
(.23) 
38.48 
(13.85) 
.17 
(.37) 
Migrant 
German c. 
30 4.28 
(.20) 
38.13 
(10.15) 
3.63 
(1.52) 
.46 
(.51) 
2.42 
(.97) 
1.46 
(.59) 
.75 
(.44) 
.13 
(.34) 
.00 
(.00) 
35.13 
(9.59) 
.25 
(.44) 
Denmark             
Non-migrant 1226 4.51 
(.29) 
46.99 
(16.80) 
3.02 
(1.44) 
.54 
(.50) 
3.17 
(1.18) 
1.71 
(.66) 
.65 
(.48) 
.12 
(.33) 
.07 
(.25) 
42.29 
(16.57) 
.03 
(.17) 
2 & 3world 
migrant 
54 4.49 
(.38) 
39.85 
(14.07) 
3.30 
(1.69) 
.56 
(.50) 
3.41 
(1.24) 
1.56 
(.63) 
.63 
(.49) 
.09 
(.29) 
.06 
(.23) 
41.33 
(17.06) 
.09 
(.29) 
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Spain             
Non-migrant 962 4.13 
(.31) 
47.85 
(18.79) 
3.30 
(1.41) 
.52 
(.50) 
2.08 
(1.60) 
2.19 
(.83) 
.61 
(.49) 
.03 
(.17) 
.08 
(.28) 
36.69 
(13.74) 
.29 
(.40) 
2 & 3world 
migrant 
27 4.15 
(.38) 
34.79 
(14.23) 
3.61 
(1.30) 
.65 
(.49) 
2.77 
(1.49) 
1.99 
(.83) 
.64 
(.49) 
.13 
(.35) 
.03 
(.17) 
31.13 
(13.54) 
.15 
(.36) 
Finland             
Non-migrant 1735 4.35 
(.29) 
46.62 
(17.66) 
2.44 
1.32) 
.51 
(.50) 
2.95 
(1.46) 
2.15 
(.82) 
.52 
(.50) 
.10 
(.31) 
.06 
(.24) 
41.58 
(16.85) 
.03 
(.16) 
2 & 3world 
migrant 
50 4.29 
(.31) 
38.14 
(14.50) 
2.76 
(1.39) 
.66 
(.48) 
3.17 
(1.24) 
1.78 
(.79) 
.58 
(.50) 
.12 
(.33) 
.04 
(.20) 
40.22 
(17.52) 
.14 
(.35) 
UK             
Non-migrant 1573 4.45 
(.38) 
46.91 
(17.75) 
2.61 
(1.27) 
.51 
(.50) 
3.01 
(1.27) 
2.01 
(.74) 
.57 
(.50) 
.10 
(.30) 
.07 
(.26) 
42.76 
(16.75) 
.02 
(.14) 
1-world 
migrant 
48 4.50 
(.42) 
43.75 
(16.98) 
2.53 
(1.42) 
.56 
(.50) 
3.51 
(1.34) 
1.81 
(.80) 
.48 
(.51) 
.10 
(.30) 
.08 
(.27) 
44.89 
(19.63) 
.01 
(.11) 
2 & 3world 
migrant 
114 4.42 
(.45) 
41.05 
(13.17) 
2.97 
(1.33) 
.50 
(.50) 
3.49 
(1.45) 
1.45 
(.61) 
.60 
(.49) 
.11 
(.32) 
.04 
(.19) 
48.38 
(17.08) 
.14 
(.35) 
Migrant 
colonies 
85 4.47 
(.44) 
42.47 
(14.92) 
2.89 
(1.36) 
.51 
(.50) 
3.47 
(1.44) 
1.53 
(.69) 
.64 
(.48) 
.07 
(.25) 
.07 
(.25) 
46.66 
(18.09) 
.05 
(.22) 
Greece             
Non-migrant 1605 4.07 
(.36) 
49.12 
(18.51) 
3.17 
(1.45) 
.56 
(.50) 
2.19 
(1.59) 
1.83 
(.91) 
.69 
(.46) 
.02 
(.14) 
.09 
(.28) 
38.62 
(13.57) 
.24 
(.43) 
1-world 
migrant 
29 4.05 
(.26) 
32.51 
(8.44) 
3.34 
(1.44) 
.59 
(.50) 
2.71 
(1.32) 
1.80 
(.94) 
.53 
(.51) 
.00 .00 39.93 
(15.62) 
.14 
(.36) 
2 & 3world 
migrant 
158 4.02 
(.35) 
40.97 
(15.76) 
3.53 
(1.50) 
.45 
(.50) 
2.44 
(1.28) 
1.32 
(.64) 
.65 
(.48) 
.04 
(.20) 
.08 
(.27) 
30.67 
(13.73) 
.09 
(.28) 
Hungary             
Non-migrant 1440 3.64 
(.41) 
47.01 
(18.00) 
3.15 
(1.54) 
.53 
(.50) 
2.26 
(1.51) 
2.17 
(.79) 
.57 
(.50) 
.10 
(.30) 
13 
(.33) 
39.61 
(14.60) 
.12 
(.32) 
2 & 3world 
migrant 
31 3.57 
(.31) 
56.16 
(18.54) 
2.77 
(1.28) 
.55 
(.51) 
2.00 
(1.39) 
2.35 
(.84) 
.74 
(.44) 
.03 
(.18) 
.16 
(.37) 
31.69 
(9.14) 
.10 
(.30) 
Ireland             
Non-migrant 1599 4.14 
(.46) 
44.72 
(17.14) 
3.52 
(1.70) 
.53 
(.50) 
2.72 
(1.52) 
2.12 
(.88) 
.57 
(.50) 
.04 
(.20) 
.08 
(.27) 
41.48 
(15.33) 
.12 
(.33) 
1-world 
migrant 
120 4.22 
(.47) 
42.50 
(13.33) 
3.44 
(1.61) 
.62 
(.49) 
3.57 
(1.43) 
2.12 
(.83) 
.66 
(.48) 
.09 
(.29) 
.04 
(.19) 
46.23 
(18.02) 
.07 
(.25) 
Italy             
Non-migrant 638 4.25 
(.34) 
46.03 
(17.12) 
3.18 
(1.23) 
.52 
(.50) 
2.25 
(1.20) 
2.27 
(.63) 
.63 
(.48) 
.04 
(.20) 
.07 
(.25) 
39.09 
(14.23) 
.21 
(.40) 
Luxemburg             
Non-migrant 624 4.60 
(.28) 
43.77 
(17.65) 
3.04 
(1.44) 
.51 
(.50) 
2.88 
(1.64) 
2.30 
(.80) 
.55 
(.50) 
.09 
(.28) 
.08 
(.27) 
45.72 
(15.10) 
.18 
(.38) 
1-world 
migrant 
182 4.59 
(.28) 
44.72 
(14.61) 
2.88 
(1.31) 
.44 
(.50) 
3.37 
(1.89) 
2.22 
(.88) 
.66 
(.48) 
.09 
(.29) 
.04 
(.19) 
45.34 
(15.22) 
.15 
(.35) 
2 & 3world 
migrant 
198 4.49 
(.23) 
36.22 
(12.09) 
3.49 
(1.28) 
.52 
(.50) 
2.35 
(1.59) 
2.03 
(.84) 
.69 
(.47) 
.04 
(.19) 
.01 
(.11) 
35.57 
(14.34) 
.13 
(.34) 
Netherlands             
Non-migrant 1886 4.45 
(.31) 
46.07 
(16.19) 
2.94 
(1.36) 
.53 
(.50) 
3.01 
(1.30) 
2.21 
(.83) 
.66 
(.47) 
.05 
(.23) 
.05 
(.23) 
47.20 
(15.67) 
.05 
(.22) 
1-world 
migrant 
37 4.30 
(.43) 
44.19 
(17.43) 
2.91 
(1.40) 
.65 
(.48) 
3.33 
(1.52) 
2.05 
(.86) 
.52 
(.51) 
.11 
(.31) 
.07 
(.25) 
43.82 
(17.32) 
.04 
(.20) 
2 & 3world 
migrant 
95 4.31 
(.34) 
43.42 
(13.79) 
3.27 
(1.45) 
.42 
(.50) 
2.80 
(1.34) 
1.66 
(.82) 
.68 
(.47) 
.07 
(.26) 
.10 
(.30) 
44.38 
(15.87) 
.08 
(.27) 
Migrant 
colonies 
22 4.41 
(.32) 
54.53 
(15.88) 
2.49 
(1.29) 
.42 
(.51) 
2.87 
(1.07) 
1.69 
(.83) 
.53 
(.51) 
.09 
(.29) 
.27 
(.45) 
48.24 
(13.06) 
.09 
(.29) 
Norway             
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Non-migrant 1856 4.55 
(.35) 
46.98 
(17.42) 
2.60 
(1.32) 
.45 
(.50) 
3.42 
(1.12) 
2.20 
(.87) 
.52 
(.50) 
.09 
(.28) 
.07 
(.26) 
42.71 
(14.86) 
.15 
(.35) 
1-world 
migrant 
42 4.60 
(.29) 
47.68 
(15.52) 
2.41 
(1.38) 
.49 
(.51) 
3.98 
(1.43) 
1.66 
(.83) 
.46 
(.50) 
.08 
(.27) 
.14 
(.35) 
46.51 
(15.99) 
.14 
(.35) 
2 & 3world 
migrant 
81 4.54 
(.40) 
37.87 
(12.54) 
2.65 
(1.42) 
.43 
(.50) 
3.60 
(1.27) 
1.73 
(.84) 
.55 
(.50) 
.07 
(.26) 
.02 
(.15) 
44.09 
(16.01) 
.18 
(.39) 
Poland             
Non-migrant 1769 3.71 
(.35) 
42.99 
(18.40) 
3.67 
(1.68) 
.51 
(.50) 
2.49 
(1.50) 
2.24 
(.78) 
.59 
(.49) 
.04 
(.19) 
.09 
(.29) 
38.96 
(14.51) 
.15 
(.35) 
Portugal             
Non-migrant 929 4.02 
(.38) 
48.58 
(18.18) 
3.07 
(1.32) 
.56 
(.50) 
1.49 
(1.23) 
2.05 
(.84) 
.72 
(.45) 
.03 
(.18) 
.09 
(.28) 
36.65 
(14.99) 
.13 
(.34) 
2 & 3world 
migrant 
49 4.12 
(.34) 
40.32 
(11.58) 
3.60 
(1.18) 
.55 
(.50) 
2.38 
(1.48) 
1.47 
(.60) 
.58 
(.50) 
.02 
(.14) 
.06 
(.24) 
40.70 
(13.66) 
.01 
(.09) 
Migrant 
colonies 
31 4.12 
(.36) 
37.83 
(10.09) 
3.61 
(1.24) 
.52 
(.51) 
2.23 
(1.09) 
1.61 
(.65) 
.61 
(.49) 
.02 
(.13) 
.00 
(.00) 
40.29 
(11.60) 
.01 
(.09) 
Sweden             
Non-migrant 1669 4.41 
(.27) 
47.01 
(18.15) 
2.53 
(1.32) 
.48 
(.50) 
3.05 
(1.84) 
2.02 
(.80) 
.47 
(.50) 
.09 
(.29) 
.06 
(.23) 
43.47 
(16.76) 
.01 
(.12) 
1-world 
migrant 
72 4.41 
(.27) 
54.61 
(14.81) 
2.35 
(1.21) 
.60 
(.49) 
3.05 
(2.01) 
1.64 
(.76) 
.51 
(.50) 
.17 
(.38) 
.10 
(.30) 
41.39 
(18.55) 
.03 
(.17) 
2 & 3world 
migrant 
125 4.35 
(.30) 
40.41 
(15.73) 
2.94 
(1.54) 
.43 
(.50) 
3.42 
(1.76) 
1.54 
(.68) 
.47 
(.50) 
.15 
(.36) 
.02 
(.13) 
42.85 
(19.94) 
.06 
(.25) 
USA             
Non-migrant 2611 4.61 
(.38) 
42.90 
(17.88) 
3.1 
(1.55) 
.52 
(.50) 
3.54 
(1.25) 
2.00 
(.83) 
.54 
(.50) 
.12 
(.33) 
.06 
(.23) 
42.56 
(13.41) 
.34 
(.47) 
1-world 
migrant 
58 4.50 
(.53) 
45.08 
(19.89) 
2.67 
(1.33) 
.60 
(.49) 
3.63 
(1.40) 
1.75 
(.88) 
.50 
(.50) 
.14 
(.35) 
.10 
(.30) 
43.00 
(14.50) 
.46 
(.50) 
2 & 3world 
migrant 
330 4.56 
(.43) 
40.13 
(15.38) 
3.79 
(1.82) 
.52 
(.50) 
3.12 
(1.90) 
1.60 
(.70) 
.60 
(.49) 
.06 
(.23) 
.08 
(.24) 
41.11 
(15.82) 
.31 
(.46) 
Migrant 
colonies 
34 4.64 
(.40) 
49.44 
(18.92) 
4.07 
(1.90) 
.52 
(.51) 
3.42 
(1.83) 
1.48 
(.72) 
.54 
(.50) 
.04 
(.19) 
.20 
(.41) 
44.34 
(13.70) 
.31 
(.47) 
Canada             
Non-migrant 2335 4.48 
(.37) 
42.15 
(17.64) 
3.00 
(1.40) 
.52 
(.50) 
3.09 
(1.30) 
2.07 
(.89) 
.50 
(.50) 
.10 
(.30) 
.07 
(.25) 
43.12 
(10.35) 
.30 
(.46) 
1-world 
migrant 
308 4.52 
(.34) 
53.43 
(16.66) 
2.90 
(1.35) 
.50 
(.50) 
3.10 
(1.46) 
1.75 
(.88) 
.70 
(.46) 
.10 
(.31) 
.08 
(.27) 
45.00 
(10.60) 
.36 
(.48) 
2 & 3world 
migrant 
334 4.41 
(.43) 
41.81 
(16.32) 
3.88 
(1.84) 
.53 
(.50) 
3.21 
(1.54) 
1.25 
(.57) 
.60 
(.49) 
.07 
(.25) 
.07 
(.25) 
42.72 
(10.25) 
.35 
(.48) 
Note: Only those type of migrants per country, which have a N equal or larger than 20, are shown here and used in the further analyses.  These results are weighted for design weight. 
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Table 2: OLS Regressions of Log Household Income on Migrant Type, Individual Characteristics, Country 
Dummy Variables and Second Order Interactions (Unstandardized Coefficients) . 
Variables  Model 1: 
migrant types 
& countries 
Model 2: 1 &  
characteristics 
& interactions 
with gender 
Model 3: 2 & 
interactions 
with migrant 
types 
Model 4: 3 & 
interactions 
country 
migrant 
Model 5: 4 & 
socioeconomic 
status & interactions 
with migrant types  
1-world migrant .02* -.01* -.11 -.10 -.11 
2 & 3 world migrant -.06 -.12 -.23 -.21 -.19 
  colonies migrant .05 .04* -.05 -.07 -.07 
Education  .07 .07 .07 .05 
N household  .06 .06 .06 .06 
Married  .05 .06 .06 .05 
Age*10  .04 .04 .04 .02 
Age2*1000  .05 .05 .05 .03 
Small Residence  -.03 -.03 -.03 -.02 
Male  -.05 -.05 -.05 -.03 
Divorced/separated  -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 
Widowed  -.05 -.05 -.05 -.05 
Male*Married  .04 .04 .04 .05 
Male*Divorced  -.04 -.04 -.04 -.04 
1-world*age*10   .02 .02 .02 
2 & 3 world*education   -.02 -.02 -.02 
 2 &3 world*age*10   .04 .02 .04 
2 & 3 world*male   .04 .04 .05 
2 & 3 world*married   -.06 -.06 -.06 
2 & 3 world*residence size   .03 .02 .02* 
Colonies*married   .13 .13 .11 
1-world Canada    .05 .04 
1-world* Holland    -.13 -.12 
2 & 3 world*Czech    -.12 -.12 
2 & 3 world*Canada    -.07 -.05 
2 & 3 world*Holland    -.11 -.12 
Colonies*Holland    .16 .16 
Socioeconomic index*10     .04 
Missing Socioeconomic index     -.08 
Male*isei*10     -.01 
2 & 3 world* missing isei     -.06 
Austria -.26 -.25 -.25 -.25 -.28 
Belgium -.25 -.19 -.19 -.19 -.22 
Schweiz .07 .11 .11 .11 .06 
Czech R. -.69 -.65 -.65 -.65 -.67 
Germany -.20 -.16 -.16 -.16 -.19 
Denmark -.09 -.05 -.05 -.05 -.07 
Spain -.47 -.38 -.38 -.38 -.40 
Finland -.26 -.17 -.17 -.17 -.20 
UK -.16 -.10 -.09 -.09 -.13 
Greece -.54 -.46 -.46 -.46 -.48 
Hungary -.96 -.87 -.87 -.87 -.90 
Ireland -.46 -.44 -.44 -.44 -.47 
Italy -.35 -.27 -.27 -.27 -.30 
Luxemburg -.02* .04 .04 .04 .00* 
Holland -.16 -.12 -.12 -.11 -.17 
Norway -.06 -.02* -.01* -.01* -.03 
Poland -.89 -.85 -.85 -.85 -.88 
Portugal -.57 -.44 -.44 -.44 -.48 
Sweden -.20 -.13 -.13 -.13 -.17 
Canada -.13 -.09 -.09 -.09 -.10 
Constant 4.61 4.15 4.17 4.16 4.13 
Adjusted R2 .38 .53 .53 .53 .54 
 Note: Non-migrant and USA are the reference categories of the three types of migrants and the  countries; * not significant. These results are weighted for design weight. 
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Table 3: Macro-Level Characteristics of Countries in the Analysis  
 
Countries GNI per 
capita 
(2002) 
Social 
expenses 
per GDP 
(1998) 
Foreigners 
as % of 
population 
(2000) 
Net 
migration 
rate 
(2003) 
Weighted 
inflow 
asylum 
seekers 
(2000) 
Status 
recognized 
(2000) 
Naturalization 
in % of stock 
of foreigners 
Stock 
foreign 
labor 
force  
(2000) 
Unemployment 
rate 
(2002) 
Weighted  
unemployment 
male 
foreigners 
 (2000-01) 
Weighted 
self-
employment 
foreigners 
 (2001) 
Austria       23.390  26,8 9,3% 2,4 3,7 4% 3,3% 10,5% 4,8% 4,5% 0,8 
Belgium       23.250  24,5 8,4% 1,0 2,4 27% 7,2% 8,9% 7,2% 9,6% 1,1 
Canada       22.300  18,0 15,4% 6,0 1,4 47% 4,3% 19,2% 7,6% -0,4%  
Czech 
Republic 
        5.560  19,4 2,0% 1,0 1,8 1% 3,6% 2,0% 9,8% 0,5% 1,8 
Denmark       30.290  29,8 4,8% 2,0 2,3 52% 7,3% 3,4% 5,1% 8,6% 1,2 
Finland       23.510  26,5 1,8% 0,6 0,3 38% 3,3% 1,5% 8,5% 14,2% 1,1 
Germany       22.670  27,3 8,9% 2,2 1,1 25% 2,6% 8,8% 9,8% 6,2% 0,9 
Greece       11.660  22,7 2,2% 2,0 0,5 18% 0,3% 3,8% 10,3% 0,4% 0,4 
Hungary         5.280  14,4 1,3% 0,8 1,0 5% 5,9% 0,9% 5,8%  1,0 
Ireland       23.870  15,8 3,2% 3,6 2,7 4% 0,9% 3,7% 4,3% 1,0% 1,2 
Italy       18.960  25,1 2,4% 2,1 0,2 20% 1,0% 3,6% 9,1% -0,6% 0,7 
Luxembourg       38.830  22,1 36,3% 9,1 1,6 22% 0,4% 57,3% 4,1% -1,3% 0,9 
Netherlands       23.960  23,9 4,1% 2,4 2,1 15% 7,5% 3,4% 3,0% 2,8% 1,0 
Norway       37.850  27,0 4,0% 2,1 3,3 33% 5,2% 3,2% 3,9% 1,6% 1,0 
Poland         4.570  22,8 0,5% -0,5 0,1 5% 0,6%  18,1%   
Portugal       10.840  18,2 2,1% 0,5 0,0 23% 0,3% 2,0% 4,7% 5,3% 0,9 
Spain       14.430  19,7 2,2% 1,0 0,2 6% 1,3% 1,2% 11,3% 3,6% 1,2 
Sweden       24.820  31,0 5,4% 1,0 2,7 27% 9,1% 5,0% 4,0% 10,6% 0,9 
Switzerland       37.930  28,3 19,1% 1,4 2,9 36% 2,1% 18,3% 1,9% 3,0% 0,8 
United 
Kingdom 
      25.250  24,7 3,9% 2,2 1,5 26% 3,5% 4,4% 5,2% 4,3% 1,1 
United 
States 
      35.060  14,6 9,8% 3,5 0,3 30% 3,1% 12,4% 5,8% -0,5% 1,2 
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Table 3 (continued): Macro-Level Characteristics of Countries in the Analysis 
 
Countries Participation 
rate 
nationals 
 (2000-01) 
Participation  
rates 
foreigners 
 (2000-01) 
Difference 
in 
participation 
rate national-
foreigners  
Foreigners 
with third 
level 
education 
Member  
Schengen 
agreement 
Immigration  
regulated 
via annual 
quota 
system 
Skill-
selective 
immigration 
policy 
 
Granting of 
long-term 
residence 
rights 
(years) 
 
 
 
Family 
reunification of 
non-married 
couples? 
Family 
reunification 
beyond spouse 
and children? 
Full access to 
social security 
system for 
family 
members? 
Family 
reunification 
principle 
recognized right / 
concept of 
immigration law? 
Austria 78,9% 85,1% -6,2% 13,3%  Y  Y Y 5  N   N   N  Y 
Belgium 73,3% 72,4% 0,9% 20,2%  Y  N N 7  N   Y   Y  Y 
Canada 73,8% 68,4% 5,4% 22,9%  N  Y Y 0  N   Y   Y  Y 
Czech 
Republic 
78,7% 87,8% -9,1% 23,4%  N  N N 
8 
 N   N   N  N 
Denmark 84,1% 71,2% 12,9% 27,7%  Y  N N 7  Y   N   N  Y 
Finland 79,4% 83,1% -3,7% 28,6%  Y  N N 2  Y   Y   N  Y 
Germany 78,9% 77,6% 1,3% 15,2%  Y  N N 5  N   N   Y  Y 
Greece 76,2% 89,2% -13,0% 19,6%  Y  Y Y 10  N   N   N  Y 
Hungary 67,6% 77,8% -10,2% 28,1%  N  N N 3  N   N   N  N 
Ireland 79,2% 77,0% 2,2%   N  N Y 10  N   N   N  Y 
Italy 73,6% 87,7% -14,1% 13,0%  Y  Y N 5  N   Y   Y  Y 
Luxembourg 74,0% 79,7% -5,7% 21,7%  Y  N N 
- 
 N   N   N  N 
Netherlands 84,9% 69,5% 15,4% 21,6%  Y  N N 5  Y   Y   Y  Y 
Norway 84,6% 82,1% 2,5% 36,5%  Y  N N 7  Y   Y   N  Y 
Poland      N  N N 5  N   N   N  Y 
Portugal 79,0% 81,5% -2,5% 14,3%  Y  Y Y 5  N   Y   N  Y 
Spain 77,3% 85,4% -8,1% 28,8%  Y  Y N 5  N   Y   Y  Y 
Sweden 78,0% 63,1% 14,9% 29,9%  Y  N N 5  Y   N   N  Y 
Switzerland 89,2% 89,5% -0,3% 23,7%  N  Y Y 10  N   Y   N  Y 
United 
Kingdom 
83,1% 75,6% 7,5% 39,3%  N  N Y 
4 
 Y   Y   N  Y 
United 
States 
80,7% 85,6% -4,9% 40,9%  N  Y Y 
0 
 N   Y   N  Y 
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Table 4: Multilevel regression of log household income on migrant type, significant individual characteristics, 
macro-characteristics of migration and their second order interactions  
Variables  Model  5A Model 6 
1-world migrant -.08 (.03) -.11 (.04) 
2 & 3 world migrant -.17 (.03) -.11 (.03) 
Colonies migrant -.03 (.03) -.04 (.04) 
Education .05 (.00) .05 (.00) 
N household .06 (.00) .06 (.00) 
Married .05 (.01) .05 (.01) 
Age*10 .02 (.01) .03 (.01) 
Age2*1000 .05 (.01) .05 (.01) 
Small residence size -.02 (.00) -.02 (.00) 
Male -.04 (.01) .02 (.01) 
Divorced/separated -.02 (.01) -.02 (.01) 
Widowed -.04 (.01) .06 (.01) 
Male*Married .06 (.01) .06 (.01) 
Male*Divorced -.04 (.01) -.05 (.01) 
1-world*age*10 .02 (.01) .02 (.01) 
2 & 3 world*education -.02 (.00) -.06 (.02) 
 2 &3 world*age*10 .03 (.01) .02 (.01) 
2 & 3 world*male .05 (.01) .05 (.01) 
2 & 3 world*married -.05 (.02) -.05 (.02) 
2 & 3 world*small residence size .02 (.01) .02 (.01) 
Colonies*married .11 (.04) .11 (.04) 
Socioeconomic index*10 .04 (.00) .05 (.00) 
Missing Socioeconomic index -.08 (.01) -.10 (.01) 
Male*isei*10 .01 (.00) -.01 (.00) 
2 & 3 world* missing isei -.08 (.02) -.05 (.02) 
GNI per capita (2002)   
Social expenses per GDP (1998)   
Foreigners as % of population (2000)   
Net migration rate (2003)   
Weighted inflow asylum seekers (2000)   
Status recognized (2000)   
Naturalization in % of stock of foreigners   
Stock foreign labor force  (2000)   
Unemployment rate (2002)   
Weighted unemployment male foreigners  (2000-01)   
Weighted self-employment foreigners (2001)  -.33 (.09) 
Participation rate nationals (2000-01)   
Participation rates foreigners  (2000-01)  4.61 (.73) 
Participation rate national-foreigners   4.62 (.60) 
Foreigners  with third level  education   
Member Schengen agreement   
Immigration regulated via annual quota system   
Skill-selective immigration  policy   
Granting of long-term residence rights (years)  -.04 (.01) 
Family reunification recognized right / concept of immigration law   
Family reunification of non-married couples   
Family reunification beyond spouse and children   
Full access to social security system for family members   
Participation rates foreigners  (2000-01)* 2 & 3 world*education  .06 (.03) 
Constant 3.82 (.06) .64 (.56) 
Individual variance .09 (.00) .09 (.00) 
Country variance .07 (.02) .01 (.00) 
-2*log likelihood 14893 10254 
Note: unstandardized parameters with standard errors in parentheses; empty cells indicate nonsignificant parameters  
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Table 5: Change in -2*log likelihood by assuming ad random variance between countries of the individual 
independent variables in the various Models 
Variables  Table 4, Model 5A  Table 4, Model 6 
1-world migrant -2 0 
2 & 3 world migrant -3 0 
Colonies migrant 0 0 
Education -447 -416 
N household -198 -98 
Married -108 -42 
Age -305 -247 
Age2 -342 -256 
Small residence size -214 -138 
Male -9 -6 
Divorced/separated -33 -35 
Widowed -128 -83 
Socioeconomic index -205 -185 
Missing Socioeconomic index -203 -124 
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Table 6: Change in -2*log likelihood by adding separately the macro-characteristics of migration and their 
interaction with 2 & 3 world migrant and with 2 & 3 world migrant*educational level 
 
 Main effect  Interaction with 
2 & 3 world 
migrant 
Interaction with 
2 & 3 world 
migrant 
*educational level 
GNI per capita (2002) 40 2 2 
Social expenses per GDP (1998) 5 0 0 
Foreigners as % of population (2000) 7 2 2 
Net migration rate (2003) 5 4 6 
Weighted inflow asylum seekers (2000) 3 1 4 
Status recognized (2000) 16 0 1 
Naturalization in % of stock of foreigners 1 3 5 
Stock foreign labor force  (2000) 1152 1 1 
Unemployment rate (2002) 9 0 0 
Weighted unemployment male foreigners  (2000-01) 2100 1 0 
Weighted self-employment foreigners (2001) 2997 1 0 
Participation rate nationals (2000-01) 1155 2 5 
Participation rates foreigners  (2000-01) 1048 8 16 
Participation rate   in % 1153 3 7 
Foreigners  with third level  education 2999 2 5 
Member Schengen agreement 2 0 0 
Immigration regulated via annual quota system 0 0 0 
Skill-selective immigration  policy 0 0 0 
Granting of long-term residence rights (years) 1660 0 0 
Family reunification recognized right / concept of immigration law 3 2 0 
Family reunification of non-married couples 3 0 0 
Family reunification beyond spouse and children 4 0 1 
Full access to social security system for family members 0 4 4 
